Abstract
INTRODUCTION
This paper is an extended version of [1] and presents a new class of crypt-analytical attacks, which are applicable against those ciphers, whose analysis theory is based on the properties of 2-adic numbers. This new class of crypt-analytic attacks is named as 'Linearisation Attacks' and it consists of three variants, which are named as 'Conventional Linearisation Attacks (CLAs)', 'Fast Linearisation Attacks (FLAs)' and 'Improved Linearisation Attacks (ILAs)'. The paper demonstrates the Linearisation attacks with reference to F-FCSR [3, 4] family of binary additive synchronous stream ciphers. The ciphers of this family consist of a Galois Feedback with Carry Shift Register (FCSR) [11] , whose states are filtered by using linear Boolean functions. In this paper, we cryptanalyse an eSTREAM candidate F-FCSR-H v2 [5] , and another variant of this cipher, which is known as F-FCSR-H. These ciphers are considered important members of the F-FCSR family of stream ciphers. It is pertinent to mention that, F-FCSR-H v2 was initially included in the eSTREAM portfolio for hardware profile [13] , but after discovery of some weaknesses [8, 9] in the key-stream generator, it was removed from the revised portfolio [14] .
Linearisation attacks on such ciphers are based on a new observation, which is also described in this paper. To cryptanalyse F-FCSR-H v2 and F-FCSR-H stream ciphers, we present state recovery algorithms based on CLAs, FLAs and the ILAs for these ciphers. A comparative analysis of these attacks is also presented, which shows that these attacks are the most efficient attacks on these ciphers. Further more, the comparative analysis also shows that CLAs, FLAs and ILAs provide a tradeoff between data, time and memory complexities, when compared with each other.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the operation of a Galois FCSR and the construction of the F-FCSR-H v2. Sections 3 to 8 contain the main results of this paper. In Section 3, we present the new class of cryptanalytic attacks, which is named as 'Linearisation Attacks'. In this section, we present three variants of linearisation attacks, i.e. CLAs, FLAs and the ILAs. In Sections 4,5,6, we describe the applications of linearisation attacks on F-FCSR-H v2 and present state recovery algorithms based on CLAs, FLAs and ILAs to recover the internal states of F-FCSR-H v2 and F-FCSR-H stream ciphers. In Section 7, we present a comparative analysis of these attacks on F-FCSR-H v2 key-stream generator, in terms of data, time and memory complexities. In Section 8, we present a key recovery algorithm, which works in conjunction with the state recovery algorithms and recovers the effective key used in these ciphers. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 9.
II. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF F-FCSR-H V2
In this section, we give a brief description of F-FCSR-H and F-FCSR-H v2 key stream generators. These keystream generators use the same filtered Galois FCSR [11] to produce the key stream for encryption or decryption. A Galois FCSR is a finite state machine, which consists of a main register, a carry register and a feedback function. 
To produce the key-stream, F is applied on the main register states: 
With these sub filters, the F-FCSR-H and F-FCSR-H v2 generators produce one byte of key-stream in such a way that each sub-filter generates 1 bit per clock cycle.
We consider a cryptanalytic attack as an algorithm, which exploits some bias in the function of the generator. To estimate the time complexity of such an algorithm, we consider one step of the algorithm as one primitive operation and define the worst and the average case running time complexities as follows.
Definition 2.2
The worst-case running time complexity of an algorithm expressed, as a function of the input is an upper bound on the running time for any input. Similarly, the average case running time complexity of an algorithm is the average running time expressed as a function of the input over all inputs of a fixed size.
III. LINEARISATION ATTACKS
Linearisation attacks are based on the theory of linearisation intervals (See Definition 3.1) to exploit the time dependent inherent non-linearity of the primitives such as FCSRs, which are used as pseudo-random sequence generators in the cryptographic schemes. These attacks use correlations between various parts of the internal states of the ciphers and thus have close resemblance with the correlation attacks. Further more, these attacks are different from linear cryptanalysis, which mainly rely on time independent statistical linear relations between the input and output of the non-linear primitives such as S-boxes used in block ciphers. These attacks also differ from techniques of linearising the attack equations. These types of techniques are more effectively used in algebraic attacks and are usually referred to as linearisation methods or linearisation techniques to solve algebraic equations in finite fields. In such methods, linearisation of the attack equation is achieved by replacing a monomial of degree more than 1 with a new independent variable of degree 1. Study of linear structures in block ciphers [6] and cryptanalysis of syndrome-based hashes [12] are two more examples, which use techniques based on linearisation but in a different context, than our approach used to define the linearisation attacks. In general, such techniques are probabilistic and time independent, which transform nonlinear transformations into linear or affine transformations.
The linearisation attacks described in this paper combine a variety of concepts relating to deterministic and probabilistic techniques, which exploit particular cipher structures with the generalized techniques such as linear, correlation and guess-and-determine attacks. The combinations of various techniques make these attacks more successful against those ciphers whose analysis theory depends on the properties of 2-adic numbers. In the context of FCSR-based ciphers, these attacks exploit the inherent non-linearity of the FCSRs in a time dependent fashion. These attacks are particularly more effective against the class of FCSR-based ciphers, which use, linear Boolean functions to filter the internal states of the keystream generator. In such cipher secret key and IV are used to define the initial state of the ciphers.
Linearisation attacks are known plaintext attacks. The attack scenario of linearisation attacks is based on Kerkhoff's principle [10] , which means that the attacker knows full details of the cipher and its implementation. The goal of the cryptanalyst is to re-construct the whole key-stream by recovering the internal state of the cipher given the key-stream 
Such contiguous intervals of duration I are defined as linearisation intervals and are denoted by LI.
There are three types of linearisation attacks, which are tradeoffs between data, time and memory complexities when compared with each other. In the context of FCSRbased ciphers, these attacks are briefly described in the following sections.
A. Conventional Linearisation Attacks
The CLAs on FCSR-based ciphers exploit only the inherent non-linearity of the FCSRs and use only the value of the feedback bit 0 m during the linearisation intervals (See Definition 3.1). This means, CLAs use the correlations between the feedback bit and the carry register of the FCSR. Further more, these attacks do not require any additional information relating to any other part of the internal state of the ciphers.
B. Fast Linearisation Attacks
The FLAs on FCSR-based ciphers exploit the correlations between the feedback bits; the carry register and some portions of the main register cells. This means, the FLAs in addition to using the linearisation intervals also make use of the 3-dimensional correlation between the feedback bit, the carry register and the Hamming weight of the main register of Galois FCSRs. These correlations show that the FCSR sequences observed in various main register cells are dependent, correlated and identically distributed (See [2] for more details). As shown in [2] that during the linearisation intervals of duration n (say), n cells on both edges of the FCSR main register are correlated. This enables us to determine exactly n cells on both edges of the main register during the linearisation intervals. The FLAs make use of this additional information. Further more, these attacks are more successful against those ciphers, which use linear Boolean functions to filter the main register states of Galois FCSRs.
C. Improved Linearisation Attacks
The ILAs combine the correlations between the feedback bits, the carry register and the Hamming weight of the main register with the guess-and-determine approach. The main goal of this novel approach used in ILAs is to reduce the upper bound for the known keystream. This results in increasing the efficiency of the linearisation attacks. In ILAs, we guess a small portion of the internal state of the cipher and determine its accuracy by using exhaustive search technique. This approach of combining various pre-determined and guessed parameters, results in improving the data and memory complexities at the expense of some extra computations, which slightly increase the running time complexities of these attacks when compared with CLAs and FLAs. However, from the cryptanalytic point of view, the gain in the data complexity is more valuable, because otherwise, the attack fails to recover the internal state of the cipher.
IV. STATE RECOVERY ALGORITHM BASED ON CLAS FOR F-FCSR-H V2 AND F-FCSR-H In this section, we present Algorithm 1, which is a state recovery algorithm based on the CLAs and recovers the internal states of the F-FCSR-H v2 and F-FCSR-H stream ciphers by using some known key-stream.
Algorithm 1 is an iterative procedure, which requires some known key-stream and the linear Boolean function, which is used to filter the main register states, as inputs and gives as output the internal state of the FCSR. The linear Boolean function, which is used in F-FCSR-H and F-FCSR-H v2 ciphers, extracts one byte during each clock cycle of the generator in such a way that each 20-bit sub filter extracts one bit. Therefore, if we have a linearisation interval of duration 20 contiguous clock cycles of the generator, then the systems of equations formulated in step-1. It is pertinent to mention that the online phase of Algorithm 1 is computationally most expensive step of this attack. Therefore, analysis of this phase determines the data, time and memory complexities of the attack, which are considered as main metrics to determine the efficiency of any cryptanalytic attack.
Theorem 1 shows that the worst-case data complexity of Algorithm 1 is equal to the key-stream generated Off-line phase of the algorithm can be considered as a pre-processing step. In this step we divide the main register states into 8 disjoint sets according to the filtering mechanism. The P-matrices are computed by simulating the behavior of the filter for 18 contiguous clock cycles assuming the generator functions in the linearisation interval during these 18 contiguous clock cycles. Note that each of these matrices is of dimension 18x20.
The step-1 of online phase of Algorithm 2 is considered as computationally most expensive step of the attack. In this step, we take 18 contiguous bytes of the key-stream, which are split into eight 18x1 matrices 0 1 Algorithm 3 shows the applications of ILAs on the F-FCSR-H v2 and the F-FCSR-H stream ciphers. This algorithm requires as input, the known values of main register cells as explained above. This additional information about the internal state of the FCSR-based ciphers, results in improving the data and memory complexities of the attack. In addition, this algorithm also uses guess-and-determine approach for two binary cells of the main register, which increases the running time complexity of the attack. Therefore, there is a slight tradeoff between the data and running time complexities of this attack. This algorithm requires eight 17x20 P-matrices, which are denoted by 0 1 7 , , , P P P  . As in the case of CLAs and the FLAs, these P-matrices are computed by simulating the behavior of the Filter F under the assumption that the generator functions in the linearisation interval for 17 contiguous clock cycles.
To estimate various complexity measures of Algorithm 3, we note that the online phase of this algorithm also includes the initialisation step. The guessand-determine approach used in this step of the algorithm, increase the maximum number of iterations in the online phase of the attack. Theorem 1 shows that the maximum known key-stream required for Algorithm 3 to recover the internal states of the F-FCSR-H v2 and the F-FCSR-H stream ciphers is equal to the key-stream generated during 
VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This section is devoted to present a comparative analysis of results of CLAs, FLAs and ILAs on the F-FCSR-H v2 and the F-FCSR-H key-stream generators as described in the preceding sections. In the three state recovery algorithms presented in the preceding sections, computationally most expensive step is the on-line phase. In this phase of these state recovery algorithms, we formulate and solve the systems of equations, which relate internal unknown state variables with the known values of the key-stream. Therefore, analysis of the on-line phase of the algorithms determines various performance metrics of the attack. Table 1 , we present such an analysis, which compares the three different complexity measures, i.e. required length of known key-stream, number of equations to be solved and the number of solutions to be stored for the three types of linearisation attacks.
The results presented in Table 1 , show that ILA is the most efficient attack in terms of data and memory complexities. These results also show that FLA is the most efficient attack in terms of time complexity. CLAs are easy to implement in software as compared to FLAs and the ILAs. In summary, this analysis shows that these variants provide a trade-off between various complexity measures, when compared with each other.
VIII. KEY RECOVERY
In this section, we present a key recovery algorithm, which recovers the effective key used in the F-FCSR-H v2 and the F-FCSR-H stream ciphers. The key-recovery algorithm works in conjunction with the state recovery algorithms and recovers the effective key (See Definition 8.1) used in these ciphers. Definition 8.1 An effective key for an FCSR-based cipher, which filters the main register states of a Galois FCSR by using a linear Boolean function, is defined as the FCSR state, which generates the first key-stream unit, which may or may not be used for encryption or decryption. 
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a new class of cryptanalytic attacks, which are applicable against those ciphers whose analysis theory depends on the properties of 2-adic numbers. The new class of cryptanalytic attacks is referred to as 'Linearisation Attacks'. This class consists of three variants, namely, 'Conventional Linearisation Attacks', 'Fast Linearisation Attacks' and the 'Improved Linearisation Attacks'. All these variants provide a tradeoff between data, time and memory complexities when compared with each other. These attacks are demonstrated against the F-FCSR family of stream ciphers by cryptanalysing two important members of this family, which are known as F-FCSR-H v2 and the F-FCSR-H. To cryptanalyse these ciphers, we presented state recovery algorithms based on the three different variants of the linearisation attacks. These algorithms recover the internal secret state of the ciphers. A comparative analysis of different attacks on F-FCSR-H v2 and F-FCSR-H stream ciphers is also presented, which shows various tradeoffs between these variants in terms of data, time and memory complexities. This analysis shows that CLA is easy to implement, but requires more resources such as known key-stream, processing time, etc. The FLA is the most efficient attack in terms of running time complexity. The ILA is the most efficient attack in terms of data and memory complexities. The paper also presented a key recovery algorithm, which works in conjunction with the state recovery algorithms and recovers the effective key used in the ciphers.
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